

A Quantitative Analysis of Peer Review

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Abstract

In this paper we focus on the analysis of peer reviews and reviewers behaviour in a number of different review processes. More specifically, we report on the development, definition and rationale of a number of appropriate quantitative metrics to assess the processes main properties. We then apply the proposed metrics and analysis framework to data sets from conference evaluation processes and we discuss the results implications and their eventual use toward improving the analyzed peer review processes. A number of unexpected results were found, in particular: (1) the low correlation between peer review outcome and impact in time of the accepted contributions and (2) the presence of a high level of randomness in the analyzed peer review processes.

Introduction

Peer review is one of the most established and most controversial aspects of research assessment. Virtually every active researcher has - at one time or another - gained great benefit from a reviewer who helped to correct unnoticed (and sometimes serious) errors, suggested ways to clarify or improve results and their description, or brought to the attention other related work that was of great interest. At the same time most researchers have also experienced some of their papers or research proposals being blocked by reviews that seemed very superficial at the best and in some cases even mendacious. Indeed, peer review has been defined by Kassirer and Campion (1994) as a crude and understudied, but indispensable process or by Smith (2006) as a process “whose effectiveness is a matter of faith rather than evidence”. These arguments are mostly based on the assumption that reviewers sometime are not completely objective, but are, instead, biased or, worst, they have malicious intents against rival scientists they do not like (Lawrence, 2003). Moreover, peer review processes have been not yet investigated in detail with a scientific quantitative approach.

Since the role of the peer review process is fundamental for science (to select quality contributions), for innovation (to select relevant research proposals and patents) and for people (to provide proper credits assignment as well as career advancement), we think it is crucial to monitor it more closely and quantitatively in order to provide to all involved stockholders all relevant information in the most transparent way.

The focus of our work is to analyze and understand the characteristics of current review processes in academia. In parallel, we aim to highlight strengths and weaknesses of the processes and to study quantitatively aspects potentially related to two core dimensions: quality, fairness. Specially, we aim at a peer review process that allows the selection of high quality papers and proposals and that is at the same time fair. In the past this quantitative analysis were somehow hindered by the manual and paper-based nature of the evaluation procedures. Nowadays, with the use of computer supported environment (e.g. Peer Review Management Systems) quantitative analysis are feasible and -in our view -should be included in every review process.

The main contributions of the paper are: (1) the definition of an initial number of metrics capable to analyze quantitatively two core dimensions of the process: *quality* and *fairness*; (2) application of the proposed analysis framework to a large review processes' data sets from ten different conferences in Computer Science (for a total of ca. **9000 reviews** on ca. **2800 submitted contributions**).

A number of interesting (and some unexpected for us) aspects of the review system have been found. In brief for the specific analyzed data sets:

- there is a significant degree of randomness in the analyzed review processes, more marked than we initially expected; the disagreement among reviewers is high and there is very little correlation between the rankings of the review process and the impact of the papers as measured by citations.
- it has been always possible to identify groups of reviewers that consistently give higher (or lower) marks than the others independently from the quality of the specific proposal they have to assess. Moreover, we have shown that even simple unbiasing procedure can have a significant effect on the final result. This information and proposed unbiasing tool could be useful to the review chairs to improve the fairness of the review process.

Looking at the results obtained from the application of the proposed analysis framework and related metrics we were able to draw some general remarks and lessons learned.

The paper is structured as follows. First we describe the dataset we used for the analysis, then we present the dimension of our analysis (*quality* and *fairness*), detailing in the subsequent sections the proposed metrics, analysis and related results and lessons learned. Conclusion and a brief description of related work close the paper.

Data Set Description

In this work we have analyzed data gathered from ten conferences that took place from 2003 to 2010, whose topics were related to the computer science domain (Table 1). Among these, there are five conferences (C1, C3, C8, C9, C10) that took place in the period from 2003 to 2006, therefore they are “old” enough for checking the impact of the accepted papers during the years. As the data we used for the analysis are confidential, we cannot disclose the name of the conferences. So we use an ID to identify the conference and we only report approximate numbers in Table 1 to guarantee the anonymity of the original data.

In Table 1 for each conference we show (i) the conference ID; (ii) the approximate number of papers submitted to the conference; (iii) the scale used by reviewers to assign marks to papers; (iv) the typical number of reviews per paper (RPP); (v) the papers per reviewer (PPR) and (vi) the acceptance rate of the conference. The RPP and PPR reported in Table 1 are the most frequent values for each conference (specifically, those occurring for more than 10% of the times for that conference). It is in fact quite normal that in one conference - on average - three reviewers review a single paper, but sometime, in particular for some disputed papers, there could be more than three reviewers. So we see from the table that while the typical number of reviews per paper (RPP) is stable - in our data set - around 3, the number of paper assigned to reviewer (PPR) is more variable and some reviewers get a higher number of papers to review.

Table 1: Description of the conference data.

Conference ID	Number of papers	Marks scale	RPP	PPR	% accepted papers
C1	900	1,2,...,10	3-4	1-4	21
C2	250	1,2,...,7	3-4	1,2,9,10	16
C3	700	0,0.5,...,5	3	>3	27
C4	200	0,0.5,...,5	3	1-2	26
C5	200	-3,-2,...,3	3-4	1,2,7	31
C6	150	1,2,...,5	3-4	1,2,6,7	33
C7	120	-3,-2,...,3	3-4	6-8	22
C8	150	1,2,...,7	3	4,5	45
C9	40	1,2,...,4	2-4	2,4,5,7	51
C10	100	1,2,...,7	2-3	5-6	55

In the rest of the paper, we present results mainly from just one review process, due to lack of space. We present results from more than one process when there are significance discrepancies in the results obtained for different processes.

Peer Review Metrics Dimensions

In our research, we have defined a number of metrics for evaluating quantitatively peer review processes. The purpose of such metrics is to help us understand and improve peer review process along three dimensions: *quality*, *fairness* and *efficiency*. Briefly, *quality* is related to the final result: a review process ensures quality if the best contributions are chosen. *Fairness*, a process is fair if the acceptance of the contribution does not depend on the particular set of reviewers that review it. *Efficiency* is related to the time spent in preparing and assessing the contributions and to the statistical accuracy of the review results. In this paper due to lack of space we do not present efficiency-related metrics and related results. However, the interested reader can refer to Casati et al. (2010) for a complete discussion on this dimension. Moreover, here, we disregard other important potential benefits of peer reviews, such as the actual content of the feedbacks and the value they hold for authors. We focus on metrics and therefore on what can be measured by looking only at quantitative review data (e.g. marks) and not natural language comments.

Process Quality Metrics

If we had an objective way to measure the quality of each contribution we could measure the quality of each peer review process and identify which processes are more likely to be of high quality. However, quality is subjective, and there are no objective or widely accepted ways to measure it. Nevertheless, we think it is possible to define metrics that are approximate indicators of quality (or lack thereof) in a review process. In the next sub sections we explore the rationale behind a number of proposed process quality-related metrics.

Mark distribution

A very simple analysis is to look at the distributions of the marks (following the experimental scientist motto: “always look at your data”). Analyzing the distribution of marks in review processes with different mark scales, we notice that the way reviewers give marks can be influenced by the scale itself. In Figure 1 we plot distribution of marks from processes where (1) marks range from one to ten (no half-marks allowed); (2) from one to seven (no half marks); (3) from zero to five with half-marks.




Figure 1: Examples of mark distributions in conferences with three different scales

In case (3) we notice that reviewers tend not to give half marks, indeed the curve has many oscillations; while if we consider almost the same scale –i.e. the doubled scale with integer marks instead of half marks, as in (1) –the mark distribution appears concentrated around the

middle of the ratings scale¹⁶. Moreover, in case (2) reviewers tend not to give the central mark (4 in this case), but to give lower or higher marks (here the most frequent marks is 2). It seems that such a scale “forces” the reviewer to take a decision, avoiding the central marks which corresponds to a *neutral* mark.

Divergence

Let's assume that, somehow, we have the “correct” or “ideal” ranking for the contributions. In this case, it is possible to assess how much the set of the actual accepted contributions differs from the set of the contributions selected in the ideal ranking process. In the literature, the typical metric for measuring a difference between two rankings is the Kendall τ distance (Kendall, 1938). This metric, however, computes the difference in the exact position of the elements between two ranks, while in the review process the main issue is not to be in 3rd or 10th position, whether to be accepted versus to be rejected. To better capture this specific property, we use a measure called **divergence**, in order to compute the *distance* between the two rankings, i.e., the *ideal* ranking and the *actual* ranking (the outcome of the review process). We next give the formal definition of divergence following Krapivin et al. (2009), adapted to our scenario.

DEFINITION 1 (PHASE QUALITY DIVERGENCE). *Let C be a set of submitted contributions, $n = |C|$ the number of submissions, ρ_i and ρ_a , respectively, the ideal ranking and the actual ranking, and t the number of accepted contributions according to the actual ranking. We call divergence of the two rankings $\text{Div}_{\rho_i, \rho_a}(t, n, C)$ the number of elements ranked in the top t by ρ_i that are not among the top t in ρ_a . The normalized divergence*

$\text{NDiv}_{\rho_i, \rho_a}(t, n, C)$ is equal to $\frac{\text{Div}_{\rho_i, \rho_a}(t, n, C)}{t}$, and varies between 0 and 1.

Through this metric it is possible to assess how much the set of the actual accepted contributions *diverges* from the set of contributions ranked w.r.t. the ideal quality measure, and so how many contributions are “rightly” in the set of the *accepted contributions* and how many contributions are not. In Figure 2 are schematically depicted three different divergence curves resulting from the fact that (i) the two rankings are **correlated**; (ii) they are **uncorrelated** i.e. **independent** (the analytical results for this case is the straight line in the figure) and (iii) they are **inversely correlated**.

Divergence a posteriori. One aspect of the quality of the review process (i.e. its capability to select the best contributions that will have an impact in the community) can be measured *a posteriori* (years after the completion of the review process), by measuring for instance the impact that the paper had e.g. by counting citations. Hence, we can compare this ranking a posteriori, based on citations, with the one produced by the review process. However, we can do this only for accepted papers, since rejected ones have not been published, or at least not in the same version as they were submitted. We can examine the difference in the ranking in the top k contributions, with $k < t$ where in this case $t = n$ with n the number of accepted contributions. In Figure 3 is depicted the divergence between the ranking of the conference C1 and the ranking a posteriori given by the citation counts¹⁷. From Figure 3 we can notice that the two rankings are close to the uncorrelated curve, that is the ranking outcome of the conference peer review is not correlated to the citation-count ranking.

¹⁶ Please note that in the figure the scale is normalized.

¹⁷ The conference was held in 2003, so we were able to compute citations received in the subsequent years using Google Scholar. We also notice that the conference was a leading one in its field.




Figure 2: Examples of different divergence curves types




Figure 3: Normalized divergence computed for accepted papers in C1




Figure 4: Normalized divergence computed for C3 and C4 (two-phase review)




Figure 5: Example of a robust review process in C1

We have found a similar result for all our 10 data sets. From our data, one could argue that the peer review process is not good at predicting which papers will have impact in the community in the subsequent years. However, one could say that the aim of peer review process is not the selection of high-impact papers, but simply to filter junk papers and accept only the ones above a certain quality threshold. It is interesting to note that very recently a number of Journals (e.g. PlosOne) are asking specifically to the reviewers to focus only on the technical and scientific soundness of the article and not on the potential impact, since the latter will be finally decided directly by the community.

For one case, namely conference C3 and C4, we could perform a similar question in a two-phase review process. In fact, C3 and C4 refer to data from the same conference but they represent two different review phases: in C3 the reviewers are asked to evaluate some extended abstracts; only a certain number of proposed abstracts passes. Then in C4 the selected authors provide the full contributions and this time the reviewers evaluate the full papers. So for this case we could ask - for the same accepted contributions - how accurately did the first review phase predict the ranking outcome of the second review phase. In Figure 4 we plot the divergence between the first-phase and second-phase ranking. We notice that the divergence curve is more correlated than in Figure 1. Nevertheless, the second phase consistently changes the fate of the contributions submitted, e.g. by looking at 1/3 of the top papers in the two rankings, 32% of these papers differ.

Divergence for robustness analysis. A mark variation sensitivity analysis is useful in order to assess if slight modifications on the value of marks could bring a change in the final decision about the acceptance or rejection of a contribution. The rationale behind this metric is that we would like the review process to be *robust* w.r.t. minor variations in one of the marks. When reviewers need to select within, say, a 1-10 score range for a criteria, often they are in doubt and perhaps somewhat carelessly decide between a 7 or an 8 (not to mention the problem of different reviewers having different scoring standards). With a robustness metric we try to assess how much precision is important in the mark assignment process.

To this end, we apply a small stochastically positive/negative variation to each marks (typically multiple of the process's mark granularity e.g., ± 0.5) and then rank the contributions with respect to these new marks. To this end, we apply a small stochastically positive/negative variation δ to each mark (typically multiple of the process's mark granularity e.g., ± 0.5), then we rank the contributions with respect to these new marks, compute the divergence and iterate the procedure to obtain statistical data. Assuming that we accept the top t contributions, we then compute the average divergence between the two rankings in order to discover how much the set of accepted contributions differs after applying such perturbation.

Intuitively, what we do with the mark variation is a naive way to transform a mark into a random variable with a certain variance, reflecting the indecision of a reviewer on a mark. The higher the divergence, the lower the robustness.

This analysis is useful in order to assess the impact and the size of a perturbation on the mark value. This computation will be used in the following sections both for the interpretation of the disagreement metric (how big is the disagreement and what effect does it have), for the interpretation of the strength of a rating bias (how big is a detected bias) and for the "unbiasing" procedure (if eliminating the bias could lead to significant different results).

Figure 5 presents results for Conference C1. The vertical line divides the accepted papers from the rejected ones. We firstly applied a perturbation of $\delta = 1$ (meaning that we randomly selected among three possible variations of the marks: -1/0/1), then $\delta = 2$ and finally $\delta = 3$. The analysis of the data suggests that the specific review is quite robust process. Indeed, with $\delta = 1$ the fate of only 9% of the papers is affected (meaning that 9% of the papers that were initially

accepted change their fate because of the perturbation) while with $\delta = 2$ the percentage is 15% and with $\delta = 3$ (a very large variation) is 22%. In Table 2 we report results for the best results (lower divergence) and for the worst (higher divergence) in our dataset.

Table 2: Computation of robustness (average standard error is ca. 0,004)

	Granularity (ϵ)	$\delta = \epsilon$	$\delta = 2\epsilon$	$\delta = 3\epsilon$
C1	1,0	0,088	0,150	0,219
C4	0,5	0,178	0,319	0,444

Disagreement

Here, we compute first how much the marks of a reviewer i differ from the marks of the other $(r_z - 1)$ reviewers for a specific criterion j and for a specific contribution z (Definition 2). Then we compute for a specific criterion j the disagreement of a reviewer i with respect to the others over the whole set of contributions (Definition 3), and, finally, over all the criteria (Definition 4).

DEFINITION 2. (Disagreement of a reviewer on a criterion and on a contribution)

Let j be a criterion and $M_{i_z}^j$ be the mark set by the reviewer i for the criterion j assigned to a contribution z . Then, a disagreement $\phi_{i_z}^j$ among r_z reviewers on a contribution z is the euclidean distance between the mark given by the reviewer i , and the average $\mu_{i_z}^j$ of those given by the others $r_z - 1$ reviewers:

$$\phi_{i_z}^j = |M_{i_z}^j - \mu_{i_z}^j| \quad (1)$$

with:

$$\mu_{i_z}^j = \frac{1}{r_z - 1} \cdot \sum_{k \neq i_z}^{r_z} M_{k_z}^j \quad (2)$$

DEFINITION 3. (Disagreement of a review phase on a criterion) Let n be the number of the contributions and r_z the number of reviewers assigned to a contribution z , then the disagreement over all contributions on a criterion j is the average disagreement:

$$\Phi^j = \frac{1}{n} \cdot \sum_{z=1}^n \frac{1}{r_z} \sum_{k=1}^{r_z} \phi_{k_z}^j \quad (3)$$

DEFINITION 4. (Disagreement of a review phase) Let q be the number of criteria in a review phase, then the disagreement over all the criteria is:

$$\Psi = \frac{1}{q} \cdot \sum_{j=1}^q \Phi^j \quad (4)$$

The rationale behind these metrics is that in a review process we expect some kind of agreement between reviewers. While it is natural that reviewers have different opinions on contributions, however, if the marks given by reviewers are comparable to marks given at random and have high disagreement, then the results of the review process are also random, which defeats the purpose. The reason for having reviewers (and specifically for having the typical 3 reviewers per contribution) is to evaluate based on consensus or majority opinion. Intuitively, we assume that the ideal ranking is the one that we would obtain by having all experts review all papers. Then we assigned each contribution to only 3 reviewers to make the review load manageable. If the disagreement is high on most or all contributions, we cannot hope that the opinion of 3 reviewers will be a reasonable approximation or estimate for the ideal ranking.

In Table 3 we depict in the second column the computed average normalized disagreement of a review phase (Definition 4) for all 10 conferences. We have normalized the disagreement value in order to allow direct comparisons among different conferences. Both for comparison and to assist in the interpretation of the results, we also report in the same table, the average disagreement we have obtained in two simulations: (i) reshuffle experiment (third column): where we have randomly exchanged the actual marks given by the reviewers; (ii) random experiment (fourth column): where we have generated a new random (uniform) distribution of marks in the available range of marks unrelated with the actual marks distribution in our data set. The reshuffle experiment mimics the case in which one reviewer is marking a certain number of contributions, but her marks are randomly given to other unrelated contributions, while her reviewed proposals get the marks of other randomly selected reviewers. So we are sampling from the correct marks distribution function, i.e. the actual one of the analyzed review phase, but we randomize the association between marks and contributions. We would have expected these reshuffling disagreements to be much higher than the one computed with properly assigned marks. However, this does not seem the case for conferences C3, C4 and C10 (the differences between original and reshuffled disagreements (fifth column in the table 4) are 10.3 %, 15.4% and 18.8% correspondingly, while for other conferences they vary from 23 to 30 %). Indeed, it seems that there is little difference between giving marks to specific papers and randomly distributing such marks over all the papers. On the other hand, the average disagreement is constantly lower than the random one, from 33 % to 51 % (column 6 table 3). This is expected since we would hope that a group of experts in a domain would tend to agree better than a completely random process. Moreover, we applied the Welch's test (1947) to verify if the differences between the computed disagreement value and the one based on reshuffled marks were statistically significant and the test shows that the differences are indeed significant.

Table 3: Average disagreement for all conferences sorted on decreasing order of the differences between computed and reshuffled disagreements (column5). Average standard error is ca. 0,005.

Conference ID	Computed	Reshuffled	Random	Difference between computed and reshuffled disagreement (%)	Difference between computed and random disagreement (%)
C9	0,3	0,43	0,54	30,2	44,4
C6	0,26	0,37	0,52	29,7	50,0
C7	0,25	0,34	0,48	26,5	47,9
C5	0,26	0,35	0,45	25,7	42,2
C2	0,3	0,4	0,49	25,0	38,8
C8	0,34	0,44	0,51	22,7	33,3
C1	0,28	0,36	0,43	22,2	34,9
C10	0,26	0,32	0,48	18,8	45,8
C4	0,22	0,26	0,52	15,4	51,1
C3	0,26	0,29	0,44	10,3	40,9

Band Agreement

Finally, we compute the *band agreement*. Our goal here is to study the correlation in the decisions of reviewers on very good and very bad papers. The approach is based on clustering conference marks in “bands” and measuring the probabilities of giving the mark from a particular band in condition that a mark from another “band” has already been given. To this end, all marks were divided into not overlapping bands: (i) strong reject; (ii) weak reject; (iii) borderline; (iv) weak accept; (v) strong accept. We also computed the overall probability of a paper to belong to each group. We have analyzed the behavior of reviewers in two different

conferences: conference C1 without threshold of marks for acceptance and conference C3 where such a threshold is present. Results are presented in Figure 7.

We note that for conference C1 (without threshold) if somebody gave a mark from the strong reject band then other reviewers will give a mark from the weak or strong reject “band” with higher probability (these probabilities are significantly bigger than the overall probability—black line in the figure). The same can be said about the “strong accept” band. So, in this case, we can say that reviewers “strongly” agree on very good and very bad papers.

For conference C3 (with threshold) the situation is different: overall probability is biased in the direction of “weak accept” band. Here, we could suggest that when there is a mark threshold reviewers tend not to give very low marks since they know that even a mark from a “borderline” band and under threshold will eventually “kill” a contribution (they tend to be polite!). A more detailed analysis shows that if somebody gives a mark from the “strong reject” band, this increases the probability of giving marks not only from strong and weak reject bands (by 14% and 63% correspondingly) but also from borderline band (by 11%). In the “strong accept” set the probability of others giving a “weak accept” mark is 20% higher than the overall probability. So we can say that we have marks biased towards the “weak accept” band but reviewers still agree on very bad and very good contributions.




Figure 7: Band Agreement for Conference 1 (left) and Conference 3 (right)

Quality: lessons learned

From the exploration of the quality dimension we can derive a number of interesting findings:

- Monitoring mark distribution is useful since it is specific for the particular review process and mark scale. It seems thus possible to design and adapt the scale for specific purpose.
- The divergence metric is a practical metric to compare the actual ranking of the conference against various target ranking. It is useful to test the robustness of the process and the relevance of variation of the marks. The application of the divergence metric has uncovered (for the available data sets) that there is little correlation between the ranking of contributions obtained in the review process and the actual impact (citation counts) of the same contributions in the community.
- The measurement of the disagreement among reviewers is a useful metric to check and monitor the degree of process’s randomness. Having a high disagreement value means, in some way, that the judgment of the involved peers is not sufficient to state the value of the contribution itself. So this metric could be useful to improve the quality of the review process as could help to decide, based on the disagreement value, if three reviewers are enough to judge a contribution or if more reviewers are needed in order to ensure the quality of the process.

Fairness-related Metrics

A property that, we argue, characterizes a “good” review process is fairness. A review process is fair if and only if the acceptance of a contribution does not depend on the particular set of reviewers that assesses it among a given set of experts. While it is normal that different

reviewers do have different opinions, here, the problem we are trying to uncover is when reviewers are biased in various ways with respect to their peers. For example, a common situation is the one in which a reviewer is consistently giving lower marks with respect to the other reviewers for the same contributions, perhaps because he or she demands higher quality standards from the submission. Indeed, if different reviewers have different quality standards, when a contribution has the “bad luck” of being assigned to one such tough reviewer, the chances of acceptance diminish. This has nothing to do with the relative quality of the paper with respect to the other submissions. It is merely a bias introduced by the assignment process and by the nature of the reviewer that is rating contributions using, de facto, a different scale than the other reviewers. Fairness metrics aim to identify, measure, and expose the most significant biases so that the review chairs can decide if they indeed correspond to unfair review results that need to be compensated before taking the final decision. Different kinds of bias can be identified: rating, affiliation, topic, country, gender, clique bias. Using the available information in our datasets, we focused on **rating bias**, namely when reviewers are positively (or negatively) biased i.e. they consistently give higher (or lower) marks than their colleagues who are reviewing the same proposal. The way to compute the bias value is very similar to that described for the disagreement metric:

$$\phi_i^j = M_i^j - \mu_i^j$$

This time the sign of the equation is important in order to discover *positive* or *negative* biases. Indeed, if the value of ϕ_j^i is constantly positive, this means the reviewer tends to give always higher marks with respect to other reviewers; while if the value of ϕ_j^i is constantly negative then the reviewer tends to give always more negative marks than other reviewers. As for the disagreement metrics, there are several scopes to which we can apply the bias metric. For example, we can measure the bias for a single reviewer and for a particular criterion, the bias over a review phase, and the bias over all the criteria. Once biases are identified, the review chairs can take a number of actions. One could be to compensate for the specific paper under review with additional reviews. Another action could be to apply automatic or semi-automatic unbiasing algorithms: a simple one could be to modify the marks by adding or removing the bias values so that on average the overall bias of the most biased reviewers is reduced. In particular, if we take all reviewers r that have a bias greater than b and that have done a number of reviews higher than n_r , and subtract b from all marks of r (or from the top- k biased reviewers), we can obtain a new unbiased ranking. By comparing the obtained unbiased ranking with the original ranking (for instance using the divergence metrics) we can assess the overall impact of the unbiasing procedure on the particular review process.

Biases identification and effect of unbiasing procedure

Applying the proposed rating bias metric, we were able to identify groups of potentially behavioral biased reviewers. These are all reviewers with an accepting or rejecting behavior greater than the minimum mark granularity. Table 4 reports for each conference (values here are not normalized in order to compare directly with the mark granularity): (i) the conference ID; (ii) the considered bias threshold; (iii) the percentage of accepting biased reviewers; (iv) the percentage of rejecting biased reviewers; and (v) the divergence value at the acceptance threshold, i.e. the percentage of affected papers using the unbiasing algorithm. For all conferences we have included in the bias analysis only reviewers with a minimum 3 reviews. The table shows that even with simple metrics it is relatively easy to detect rating biases. Moreover, following the simple unbiasing algorithm outlined in the previous subsection, it is also possible to measure the effect of the bias on the review process.

Table 4: Examples of computed accepting and rejecting biases in four review processes

Conference ID	Bias threshold	Reviewers with accepting behaviour, %	Reviewers with rejecting behaviour, %	Divergence at acceptance threshold, %
C1	1,0	5,0	4,0	10,0
C2	1,0	7,0	7,0	12,5
C3	0,5	8,0	5,0	9,0
C4	0,5	3,0	3,0	9,0
C5	1,0	4,0	3,0	14,0
C6	0,5	1,0	2,0	7,0
C7	1,0	6,0	3,0	8,0
C8	1,0	17,0	16,0	11,0
C9	0,5	11,0	7,0	14,0
C10	1,0	5,0	13,0	7,0

5.2 Fairness-related metrics: lessons learned

From the above analysis we derive a number of interesting lessons or hints:

- the percentage of bias (accepting or rejecting behavior) is an important parameter to monitor by the review chairs and it is relatively easy to detect through the application of simple metrics;
- it is also possible to devise simple and automatic unbiasing procedures; they do not need to be applied as black boxes, but together with the analysis of the divergence between the actual ranking and the unbiased one. Divergence can provide quantitative data about the effect of biases on the final review process. Data that again can be used by the review chairs to better characterized and monitor their evaluation processes.

Our future work in the dimension of fairness-related metrics includes identifying - with similar models - other types of biases related to affiliation, topic, country, gender, clique bias and other aspects rather than limiting the analysis to accepting or rejecting biases. The challenge here is to collect and have access to the appropriate specific metadata.

Related Work and Conclusion

Peer review has been widely studied in the last years, therefore this section, due to lack of the space, is far from being complete. Even if peer review has been used as method of evaluation since Greek time, one of the first journals that was selective in the choice of its manuscripts was the *Philosophical Transaction* of the Royal Society of London, founded in 1665 (Spier, 2002). However, the first journal that introduced the peer review process as we know it today has been the *Medical Essays and Observations*, first published in 1731 (Spier, 2002).

Peer review has been analyzed and studied by several researchers, however, we notice that such analysis are not straight comparable, as they refer to review processes coming from different disciplines and different journals. Indeed, sometime even analysis done in the same field can lead to contradictory results (Jefferson et al. 2002a). The various studies on peer review differ in which metric they evaluate and in the kind and amount of data that is available. Indeed, having precise objectives for the analysis is one of the key and hardest challenges as it is often unclear and debatable to define what it means for peer review to be effective (Jefferson et al. 2002b).

Some scientists investigated if peer review is really able to improve the quality of a paper and correct consistent errors. A study was conducted by Goodman et al. (1994) who tried to measure the quality of the papers submitted to the *Annals of Internal Medicine* between March 1992 and March 1993 before and after the peer review process. They did not find any substantial difference in the manuscripts before and after publication. Indeed, they state that peer review was able to detect only small flaws in the papers, such as figures, statistics and description of the results. An interesting study was carried out by Godlee et al. (1998): they

introduced deliberate errors in papers already accepted by the British Medical Journal(BMJ). Godlee et al. report that the mean number of major errors detected was 2 out of a total of 8, while there were 16% of reviewers that did not find any mistake, and 33% of reviewers went for acceptance despite the introduced mistakes.

Citation count was used as a metric mostly in studies by Bornmann and Daniel (2005b). A first study reports on whether peer review committees are effective in selecting people that have higher citation statistics, and finds that there is indeed such a correlation. Another very interesting study concerns preliminary review of papers by staff editors of journals, before sending the papers through a peer review process. The study observes that “three-quarters of the manuscripts that were rated negatively at the initial internal evaluation but accepted for publication after the peer review had far above-average citation counts” (Bornmann and Daniel, 2010). To the best of our knowledge, none of the prior art uses the same metrics we define in the process quality section. Many works, such as the interesting work by Bornmann and Daniel, do consider one of them (citations) as a validity metric, but do not consider the rankings that come out of the peer review process and compare them with citations, which is one of the main aspect we consider in this paper. Furthermore, our work differs for the scale of the analysis, in terms of number of papers and reviews taken into consideration. Indeed, some aspects of peer review remain understudied because it is difficult to have access to data. However, we succeeded in collecting 10 conference review data, while in other works, authors are restricted to analyze only 1-2 conferences, grant applications processes or fellowships as Reinhart (2009) who analyze 496 applications for project-base funding, Bornmann and Daniel (2005a) who studied the selection process of 1,954 doctoral and 743 post-doctoral applications for fellowships and Bornmann et al.(2008) who analyze 668 applications for funding. For what concern studies on bias, there are works that have found *affiliation* bias (meaning that researchers from prominent institutions are favored in peer review) (Ceci and Peters, 1982), bias in favor of US-based researchers (Link, 1998), or *gender* bias against female researchers (Wenneras and Wold, 1997). In our work, we compute the rating bias (reviewers consistently giving higher or lower marks), which is a kind of bias that appears rather often, that is easy to detect, and that can be corrected with rather simple procedures.

In conclusion, in this work we have presented and discussed the results of the analysis on two different dimensions (quality and fairness) on a set of conference data from the computer science field. We do not claim that these results are general, but we think that the overall analysis framework proposed here (i) can help to understand better this process, (ii) can give useful hints in order to improve current peer review process and (iii) can be generalized to different fields. In the near future we want to extend the analysis to more conferences, also from fields different from computer science.

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